Civil Procedure by Kandaras, Kenneth & Wozniak, Catherine
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 18
Issue 2 Winter 1986 1985-1986 Illinois Law Survey Article 3
1986
Civil Procedure
Kenneth Kandaras
Assoc. Prof., John Marshall Law School
Catherine Wozniak
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth Kandaras, & Catherine Wozniak, Civil Procedure, 18 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 317 (1986).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol18/iss2/3
Civil Procedure
Kenneth Kandaras*
and Catherine Wozniak**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 318
II. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND REPOSE ........... 319
A. Rule 103(b) and Voluntary Dismissal .......... 319
B. Statutes Of Repose ............................. 321
III. JURISDICTION ...................................... 323
A. Personal Jurisdiction: Procedure for Challenging
Jurisdiction .................................... 323
B. Personal Jurisdiction: Long-Arm Jurisdiction ... 325
IV. VENUE ........................... ................ 330
A. Intrastate Forum Non Conveniens .............. 330
B. Interstate Forum Non Conveniens .............. 331
V. PLEADINGS AND DISCOVERY ....................... 333
A. Amendment of Pleadings ....................... 333
B. Affidavits ...................................... 336
C . D iscovery ...................................... 338
1. Protective Orders .......................... 338
2. Privileged Matters: Interrogatories ......... 339
VI. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES ........................... 340
VII. INDISPENSABLE PARTIES ........................... 341
V III. A PPEALS ........................................... 342
A. Supreme Court Authority To Review ........... 342
B. N ew Trial ...................................... 344
C. Untimely Appeals .............................. 347
IX. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STATUTORY LAW ...... 350
A. New Or Modified Supreme Court Rules ........ 350
1. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 187: Forum
Non Conveniens ........................... 350
* Associate Professor, John Marshall Law School; B.S., 1970, Southern Illinois Uni-
versity; J.D., 1973, DePaul University.
** B.B.A., 1983, Loyola University; J.D. candidate, 1988, Loyola University of
Chicago.
Loyola University Law Journal
2. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 19: Notice of
Claim of Unconstitutionality ............... 351
3. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216:
Admissions of Fact or Genuineness of
D ocum ents ................................ 352
4. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 204:
Compelling Appearance of Deponent ....... 352
5. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 222: Limited
and Simplified Discovery in Certain Cases.. 353
B. Modified Code Of Civil Procedure Sections ..... 353
1. Section 2-1005: Summary Judgment ....... 353
2. Section 2-1302: Notice of Entry of Default
Order or Dismissal for Want of Prosecution
............................................ 3 54
3. Section 11-102: Preliminary Injunctions .... 354
4. Section 2-209.1: Actions by and Against
Voluntary Associations ..................... 355
5. Section 2-613: Separate Counts and
D efenses ................................... 355
6. Section 2-1109: Itemized Verdicts .......... 355
X. CONCLUSION ..................................... 356
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews cases decided by the Illinois Supreme Court
during the Survey period involving issues of civil procedure. The
cases discussed cover a variety of areas, including statutes of limi-
tations and repose,I jurisdiction,2 venue,3 pleadings and discovery,4
and appeals.' The article also summarizes legislative changes to
the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure enacted during the Survey
period.
Due to the large volume of Illinois Supreme Court cases decided
in the area of civil procedure during the Survey period, no appellate
court cases are discussed. Although this article is not intended to
be a comprehensive guide to Illinois civil procedure case law dur-
ing the past year, it will highlight significant changes in procedural
law and comment on the likely impact of those changes.
1. See infra notes 6-40 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 41-88 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 113-57 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 180-251 and accompanying text.
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II. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND REPOSE
A. Rule 103(b) And Voluntary Dismissal
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) 6 requires dismissal of a
plaintiff's complaint when the plaintiff fails to exercise due dili-
gence in obtaining service of process on the defendant after the
complaint is filed. If the failure to exercise due diligence occurs
prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the
entire action or the counts concerning any unserved defendant may
be dismissed without prejudice.7 If the failure occurs after the ex-
piration of the applicable statute of limitations, the dismissal is
with prejudice.
Prior to the Illinois Supreme Court decision in O'Connell v. St.
Francis Hospital,9 a plaintiff could respond to a defendant's motion
for a Rule 103(b) dismissal with prejudice by moving for a volun-
tary dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Illi-
nois Code of Civil Procedure. 10 After a voluntary dismissal, a
plaintiff was afforded a minimum of one year to refile the com-
plaint, regardless of whether the applicable statute of limitations
had run. Therefore, a plaintiff was given a second chance to effect
service properly although the statute of limitations for the claim
had expired.
In O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital," the Illinois Supreme Court
closed this legal loophole. 12 In O'Connell,13 the supreme court
6. ILL. S. CT. R. 103(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 103(b) (1985).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 112 Ill. 2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1985).
11. 112 Ill. 2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322.
12. For an example of the utilization of this legal loophole, see Dillie v. Bisby, 136 Ill.
App. 3d 170, 483 N.E.2d 307 (3d Dist. 1985). In Dillie, the appellate court held that a
trial court had discretion to consider which motion would be ruled on first. Id.
13. The procedural history of O'Connell is as follows:
Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint against a hospital and doctors on
June 29, 1983, which was the last day before the applicable statute of limitations
expired. On February 24, 1984, the first summons was issued. All defendants
were served with process between March 12 and March 20, 1984. Defendants
then moved to dismiss under Supreme Court Rule 103(b) for lack of due dili-
gence. Plaintiff sought and was granted a continuance on the dismissal hearing
until July 23, 1984. In the meantime, plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss
without prejudice under the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure § 2-1009 and refile
pursuant to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure § 13-217. The circuit court
denied defendants' Rule 103(b) motion. Plaintiff then refiled and defendants
again moved for a Rule 103(b) motion. The circuit court denied the defendants'
motion but certified an appeal to the appellate court under Supreme Court Rule
308. The appellate court denied the appeal and defendants petitioned the
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held that a trial court must rule on a defendant's Rule 103(b) mo-
tion to dismiss before it considers a plaintiff's motion for voluntary
dismissal. 4 In reaching its decision, the supreme court was con-
cerned with the administration of justice without delay.'" The
court stated that due diligence in serving process is essential to ren-
dering justice fairly and promptly. The court reasoned that the
plaintiff's actions in failing to exercise due diligence in service, vol-
untarily dismissing the complaint, and refiling long after the expi-
ration of the applicable statute of limitations, were a clear example
of the unnecessary delay of justice.' 6 Therefore, the O'Connell
court held that defendants' Rule 103(b) motion must be heard on
its merits prior to a ruling on the plaintiff's motion to dismiss
under section 2-1009.11 The court further held that section 2-1009,
to the extent that it dictated a dismissal upon plaintiff's motion,
was unconstitutional. Additionally, the O'Connell court held that
a trial court ruling on a Rule 103(b) motion may consider the cir-
cumstances surrounding the service of process of plaintiff's origi-
nal and refiled complaint.'8
Following the O'Connell decision, plaintiffs who have failed to
exercise due diligence in service can no longer circumvent a dismis-
sal with prejudice under Rule 103(b) by merely voluntarily dis-
missing their complaint and refiling it. Defendants now have the
opportunity to have their Rule 103(b) motions heard on the merits
prior to the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissing their complaints.
O'Connell may affect a class of cases unanticipated by the court.
O'Connell concerned a plaintiff who sought to refile the complaint
in Illinois and thereby circumvent the applicable statute of limita-
tions. The opinion did not address the circumstance of a plaintiff
who seeks to dismiss the Illinois complaint and initiate a new suit
in a state with a longer statute of limitations. In this instance, a
dismissal of the Illinois suit would allow the plaintiff to secure the
benefit of the other state's law, rather than circumvent Illinois law.
supreme court. The supreme court heard the appeal and held that the defend-
ants' Rule 103(b) motion should be ruled on first. O'Connell, 112 Ill. 2d at 276-
78, 492 N.E.2d at 1323-24.
14. Id. at 283, 492 N.E.2d at 1327.
15. Id. at 282, 492 N.E.2d at 1326.
16. Id. See also Meyers v. Bridgeport Machines of Textron, Inc., 113 Ill. 2d 112, 497
N.E.2d 745 (1986) (Ryan, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Ryan criticized the abuse
of the privilege granted to plaintiffs of voluntarily dismissing a complaint and refiling. Id.
at 123, 497 N.E.2d at 750. The Meyers case was ready for trial in McHenry County when
the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed and refiled in Cook County. Id.
17. O'Connell, 112 Ill. 2d at 283, 492 N.E.2d at 1327.
18. Id.
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The O'Connell decision, however, is categorical in its procedural
dictates. According to O'Connell, if a defendant's motion to dis-
miss is meritorious, the court must dismiss the plaintiff's com-
plaint with prejudice. The potential res judicata effect of this
dismissal threatens the plaintiff's ability to initiate suit in another
state. It remains unsettled whether an involuntary dismissal is a
decision on the merits for purposes of res judicata and thereby
preclusive of a future suit. If O'Connell is strictly applied to a case
in which the plaintiff seeks dismissal of the Illinois complaint to
initiate suit in a new state, the plaintiff may be barred from seeking
relief in another state: a result that impinges on the other state's
interest in its administration of justice.
B. Statutes Of Repose
During the Survey period, the Illinois Supreme Court inter-
preted statute of limitations provisions in both the medical mal-
practice and products liability areas. 19 Under section 13-212 of the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 2° a medical malpractice action
must be brought within two years of the date on which the claim-
ant knew or reasonably should have known of the injury. In either
case, the action cannot be brought more than four years after the
occurrence of the act or omission alleged to have caused the in-
jury.21 The effective date of the amendment providing the four-
year repose period was September 19, 1976.22 Under the statute, it
is evident that any cause of action occurring after September 19,
1976, must be brought within four years of the occurrence alleged
to be the cause of the injury. It is, however, uncertain whether the
four-year statute of repose is applicable to injuries sustained prior
to September 19, 1976, the effective date of the statute. Moreover,
it is unclear whether the four-year statute of repose is applicable to
injuries sustained prior to the effective date of the statute, but dis-
covered after the effective date.
In Mega v. Holy Cross Hospital,23 the Illinois Supreme Court
provided some clarification of these issues. In Mega, the court held
that the four-year statute of repose was applicable to injuries sus-
tained prior to the effective date of the statute.24 Mega involved the
consolidated appeal of two cases. The common issue in the consol-
19. See infra notes 20-40 and accompanying text.
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-212 (1985).
21. Id.
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, para. 22.1 (Supp. 1976).
23. 111 Ill. 2d 416, 490 N.E.2d 665 (1986).
24. Id. at 429, 490 N.E.2d at 671.
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idated appeal was whether the plaintiffs' actions arising from medi-
cal treatment were barred by the four-year repose period. In the
first case, the plaintiff filed a complaint on September 24, 1982,
alleging an injury arising from treatment received in 1949. The
plaintiff discovered his injury in March of 1981.25 In the second
case, the plaintiff filed his action on December 8, 1981, for injuries
resulting from treatment received between 1947 and 1954, and dis-
covered on January 8, 1980. In both cases, the treatment occurred
more than four years before the effective date of the statute and the
actions were filed more than four years after the effective date of
the statute.26
The supreme court held that, in both cases, the plaintiffs' actions
were barred by the four-year statute of repose.27 The court rea-
soned that when a statute shortens a limitations period or provides
a limitations period where one previously did not exist, a plaintiff
whose cause of action arose before that date generally is allowed a
reasonable period of time to bring his action.28 The Mega court
concluded that a reasonable time in this case was the time period
provided by the statute of repose, computed from its effective date,
September 19, 1976. Because neither plaintiff had filed his claim
within this four-year period, their actions were considered
untimely.29
The Mega court realized that its holding had the effect of barring
some actions prior to the time plaintiffs discovered their injuries.3°
The court, however, reasoned that the period of repose gave effect
to a different policy than the period of limitations.31 The court
stated that the period of repose was intended to terminate the pos-
sibility of liability after a defined period of time, regardless of a
potential plaintiff's lack of knowledge of his cause of action.32
Thus, following Mega, a cause of action will be barred by the four-
year period of repose regardless of whether or not the plaintiff has
knowledge of the injury.
Similar to the four-year repose period in the medical malpractice
statute of limitations, section 13-213 of the Illinois Code of Civil
25. Id. at 419, 490 N.E.2d at 667.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 429, 490 N.E.2d at 671.
28. Id. at 420, 490 N.E.2d at 667.
29. Id. at 422, 490 N.E.2d at 668.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Procedure33 provides for an eight-year period of repose in actions
based on strict liability in tort. The statute provides that no action
may be brought more than eight years after the date on which the
injury, death, or damage occurred. 34 Section 13-213 applies to any
cause of action occurring on or after January 1, 1979, involving
any product that was in the stream of commerce, or entered the
stream of commerce prior to, on, or after January 1, 1979. 31
The Illinois Supreme Court first evaluated the effect of this pro-
vision in Costello v. Unarco Industries, Inc..36 In Costello, the court
held that the plaintiff's cause of action was filed in a timely manner
when the action was instituted within three years of the effective
date of the statute and two years of discovery of the injury.37 In
Costello, the plaintiff filed a strict liability tort action in 1981. The
plaintiff's injury arose from exposure to asbestos which terminated
in 1945. The plaintiff, however, did not discover the resultant in-
jury until 1980.38 Although the court held that the plaintiff's cause
of action was timely, the court emphasized that it was not deciding
what constituted a reasonable period for discovering conditions af-
ter the effective date of the statute.39
The court's holding in Costello provides a plaintiff whose injury
occurred prior to the effective date of the statute of repose but was
discovered after such date, with a reasonable period of time after
the effective date of the statute to bring an action. Although the
court did not decide specifically what constituted a reasonable pe-
riod of time, the dissenting opinion asserted that the decision im-
plied that the eight-year period of repose in the statute was the
reasonable time period. 40
III. JURISDICTION
A. Personal Jurisdiction: Procedure for
Challenging Jurisdiction
In R. W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs,4 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that, after a default judgment was entered, a defendant
could challenge a court's jurisdiction by filing a special and limited
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-213 (1985).
34. Id.
35. Id. at para. 13-213(g).
36. 111 Ill. 2d 476, 490 N.E.2d 675 (1986).
37. Id. at 484, 490 N.E.2d at 678.
38. Id. at 477-78, 490 N.E.2d at 675.
39. Id. at 484, 490 N.E.2d at 678.
40. Id. at 486, 490 N.E.2d at 680 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
41. 111 Ill. 2d 304, 489 N.E.2d 1360 (1986).
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appearance.4 2 In Sawant, the trial court entered a default judg-
ment against the defendant Allied. Allied then filed a special and
limited appearance contesting jurisdiction and a motion to quash
the service of summons. Allied's motion, filed approximately six
months after it was served with process and over a month after
entry of the judgment, raised the question of whether Allied was
amenable to in personam jurisdiction in Illinois. Allied argued
that neither the long-arm statute nor the due process clause would
permit the court to exercise jurisdiction in the pending case. The
trial court ruled that section 2-301, which permits the defendant to
file a special appearance to challenge jurisdiction, was inapplicable
after the entry of a judgment, and treated the motion as a section 2-
1401 post-trial attack upon a final judgment. The Sawant court
held that, pursuant to section 2-1401, petitioners must demonstrate
affirmatively their diligence in seeking relief.43 Considering Al-
lied's delay in seeking relief, the trial court concluded that Allied
had not acted with due diligence and denied its motion.44 The
supreme court, however, held that the defendant could contest a
judgment entered without in personam jurisdiction and without re-
gard to time or diligence by filing a special appearance pursuant to
section 2-301. 45
Sawant revitalizes a long-recognized procedure for challenging a
void judgment. The court held a judgment is void if entered with-
out in personam jurisdiction, without valid service of process, or if
rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction over the
controversy. Though section 2-1401 appears to codify post-trial
attacks on judgments in a nearly exclusive manner, subsection (f)
states that the section does not preclude other existing methods of
attack on void judgments. 46 Historically well-rooted, the availabil-
ity of an independent attack upon a void judgment has been un-
derutilzed. In several cases, reviewing courts have invoked the
principle sua sponte to relieve a party from his apparent inability to
comply with section 2-1401. 41 Similarly, the Sawant court pro-
vided that a special appearance pursuant to section 2-301 may be
used to challenge a void judgment, regardless of time or the de-
42. Id. at 310, 489 N.E.2d at 1363.
43. Id. at 308, 489 N.E.2d at 1362.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 310, 489 N.E.2d at 1363.
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401(f) (1985).
47. Home State Savings Ass'n v. Powell, 73 Ill. App. 3d 915, 392 N.E.2d 598 (1st
Dist. 1979); G. Brock Stewart, Inc. v. Valenti, 43 Ill. App. 3d 673, 357 N.E.2d 180 (1st
Dist. 1976).
[Vol. 18
Civil Procedure
fendant's lack of due diligence.48
Sawant may adversely affect a plaintiff who, due to the passage
of time, is unable to prove that his judgment is premised on juris-
diction over the defendant. The passage of time and defendant's
lack of diligence become significant when they result in the un-
availability of evidence and facts needed by the plaintiff to oppose
defendant's challenge. For example, a witness who could testify to
service of process or a defendant's contacts with the forum may
become unavailable due to the defendant's delay. Sawant
presented no facts that the defendant's delay prejudiced the plain-
tiff. The decision, however, establishes that a defendant's lack of
diligence is not a relevant consideration in vacating a judgment.4 9
B. Personal Jurisdiction: Long-Arm Jurisdiction
In R. W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs,5 ° the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the Illinois Insurance Code could not provide a
basis for jurisdiction if the long-arm statute did not.51 In Sawant, a
New York insurance carrier insured an Illinois importer through a
New York broker. When several of the claims were not paid, the
New York broker was sued. The plaintiffs argued that the defend-
ant was subject to jurisdiction under certain portions of the Illinois
Insurance Code.5 2 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, and
held that the Illinois Insurance Code could not provide jurisdiction
48. Sawant, Ill Ill. 2d at 309, 489 N.E.2d at 1363.
49. Id. at 309-10, 489 N.E.2d 1363. There is a distinction between the absence of
subject matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction. The broad ruling in Sawant is
most appropriate when the rendering court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In this in-
stance, no actions by the parties can cure the infirmity. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred
by the parties' consent, nor is the issue affected by evaporative evidence. Moreover, curb-
ing the wrongful exercise of judicial power aids not only the defendant, who is relieved of
the judgment, but also protects the community at large from the rendering court's contin-
ued usurpation of power.
In personam jurisdiction, however, is quite different. The court has long recognized
that the defendant may consent to in personam jurisdiction and waive any objection to
the sufficiency of service of process. Thus, the infirmity may be obviated by defendant's
voluntary consent to jurisdiction. Conversely, a defendant's lack of diligence in pursuing
relief is itself a volitional act. Should the delay prejudice the opponent, it is hard to
imagine why Illinois ought to afford the defendant relief from the judgment. This form of
relief certainly is not compelled by the United States Constitution. Though the due pro-
cess clause insures that no state can enter a binding judgment without an appropriate
basis of in personam jurisdiction and notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of the
suit, states are nonetheless free to adopt reasonable procedures for the invocation of con-
stitutional rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Absent compliance, the individual may
be deemed to have waived the right. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
50. 111 I11. 2d 304, 489 N.E.2d 1360.
51. Id. at 311, 489 N.E.2d at 1364.
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 733-3 (1985).
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when the long-arm statute did not. 3
The court also concluded that the defendant was not subject to
jurisdiction under the long-arm statute itself.5 Under the Illinois
long-arm statute, any person who transacts business in Illinois or
commits a tortious act in Illinois submits to the jurisdiction of Illi-
nois courts for any cause of action arising from those acts."5 The
supreme court in Sawant observed that all of defendant Allied's
activities took place in New York. Noting that Allied was con-
tacted for the job in New York, conducted all its services in New
York, and paid for the job in New York, 6 the court concluded that
Allied was not transacting business in Illinois.57 Additionally, the
court reasoned, jurisdiction was not proper under the tortious-act
section of the long-arm statute because the only injury was an eco-
nomic loss felt in Illinois." The court concluded that this loss was
insufficient to confer jurisdiction in Illinois when all defendant's
activities occurred outside of Illinois.59
Sawant provides some guidance in determining when jurisdic-
tion exists as a result of the defendant's transaction of business
within the state. Consistent with earlier supreme court decisions,"
a defendant is not subject to jurisdiction under the long-arm statute
when the defendant has not solicited business from an Illinois
party or substantial performance of the contract is not required in
Illinois.6" A defendant does not transact business in Illinois merely
53. Sawant, 111 II. 2d at 311, 489 N.E.2d at 1364.
54. Id. at 312, 489 N.E.2d at 1364.
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-209 (1985).
56. Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d at 312, 489 N.E.2d at 1364.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Cook Associates, Inc. v. Lexington United Corp., 87 Ill. 2d 190, 429
N.E.2d 847 (1981); Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp., 86 Ill. 2d 431, 427 N.E.2d
1203 (1981).
61. A United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois summarized
the prevailing approach to Illinois' long-arm statute as follows:
Illinois courts make a clear distinction between contacts initiated in Illinois by
an agent of a nonresident defendant and contacts made by an agent of the plain-
tiff in the non-resident defendant's state. In the former situation the defendant
has entered the state and contacted the plaintiff here, and consequently the
courts have found jurisdiction. .
Where the plaintiff's agent has gone into a foreign jurisdiction to initiate or
obtain a sale, however, the courts have found no jurisdiction absent other signif-
icant contacts.
... Illinois courts have examined •. . where the contract or transaction was
performed.
Caicos Petroleum Service Corp. v. Hunsaker, 551 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
The court noted that jurisdiction is likely to be found when either party was required to
Civil Procedure
because its contract conferred rights upon an Illinois party. Sa-
want underscores the need to establish that the defendant sought to
conduct some business activity in the state before asserting juris-
diction under section 2-209(a)(1). 62
In Yates v. Muir,63 the Illinois Supreme Court again interpreted
the tortious-act section of the long-arm statute.64 The supreme
court in Yates held that an Illinois court could not exercise long-
arm jurisdiction over a Kentucky attorney who had performed
legal services in Kentucky for an Illinois resident.65 In Yates, the
defendant attorney was a resident of Kentucky who was licensed to
practice law in Kentucky. The plaintiff was an Illinois resident
who retained the defendant to represent him in a federal disability
retirement claim. The prosecution of the claim was unsuccessful
and the defendant failed to execute a timely appeal.66 The plaintiff
subsequently filed a legal malpractice claim in Madison County,
Illinois, and the defendant contested jurisdiction.67
The defendant argued that Illinois did not have jurisdiction be-
cause all of the legal services were provided in Kentucky. The
plaintiff responded that Illinois jurisdiction was proper because the
defendant was required to file the appeal in Chicago, which would
have constituted the "last act" necessary for the tort charge.6 The
court agreed with the defendant that Illinois did not have jurisdic-
tion. 69 The court reasoned that the plaintiff had retained the de-
fendant, a Kentucky attorney, for services regarding a federal
administrative claim. Because these services did not require the
attorney to appear in any court in Illinois, the Yates court held that
perform major portions of a contract within the state. The court further explained that,
the Illinois long-arm statute required a higher threshold of contacts for asserting in per-
sonam jurisdiction than the minimum contacts test implicit in the due process clause. Id.
at 154-56.
62. Sawant, III Ill. 2d 304, 489 N.E.2d 1360 (1986). See also Young v. Colgate
Palmolive Co., 790 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1986). In Young, the court rejected the theory of
"impact jurisdiction" as a basis of in personam jurisdiction under the Illinois long-arm
statute. See generally Angst and Finks, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents In Illinois - Re-
cent Developments, 64 CHGO. BAR REC. 306 (1983).
63. 112 Ill. 2d 205, 492 N.E.2d 1267 (1986).
64. Id. at 208, 492 N.E.2d at 1268.
65. Id. at 210, 492 N.E.2d at 1269.
66. Id. at 206-07, 492 N.E.2d at 1267.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 208-09, 492 N.E.2d at 1268. In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 435, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961), the Illinois Supreme
Court established the "last event doctrine," holding that the place of a wrong for the
tortious act provision of the long-arm statute is where the "last event" takes place.
69. Yates, 112 Ill. 2d at 209-10, 490 N.E.2d at 1269.
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Illinois jurisdiction was improper. 70
Yates adds significant meaning to the provision in the long-arm
statute that jurisdiction may be exercised over a nonresident who
commits a tortious act in the state. In 1961, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that jurisdiction was appropriate when the last event
necessary for establishing liability occurred in Illinois.71 Reason-
ing that liability in tort arises only when the plaintiff is injured and
sustains damages, the court held that jurisdiction was proper when
the defendant could reasonably foresee that its conduct outside the
state would cause injury in the state of Illinois. Clearly, Yates lim-
its the scope of in personam jurisdiction under the tortious-act pro-
vision. Thus, without evidence of an intent to commit a tort in
Illinois, a defendant is not subject to jurisdiction simply because he
has breached a duty to an Illinois resident, or because the eco-
nomic consequence of a tort ultimately is felt in Illinois.
The effect of Yates may be most profound in its treatment of
professional malpractice suits. The Yates holding is consistent
with the due process clause; a defendant cannot be compelled to
attend a trial outside of the state in which his professional services
were performed or marketed.7 2 The Yates court relied on a federal
district court case73 which reasoned, because professional services
are personal in nature, a plaintiff who seeks out those services from
someone in another state may not subject that person to jurisdic-
tion in the plaintiff's state of residence. 4 Accordingly, in Yates,
because all the services were performed in Kentucky, the defendant
could not be compelled to attend a trial in Illinois.
Another case interpreting the toritous-act section of the Illinois
long-arm statute was In re Marriage of Highsmith.7 In Highsmith,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that an out-of-state divorced father
who sent his child to live in Illinois without providing for her sup-
70. Id.
71. Gray, 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761.
72. See also Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665, cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (9th Cir.
1984) (defendants held to be marketing services in forum state though plaintiff sought
defendants' services and was treated at defendants' facility); S.R. v. City of Fairmont, 280
S.E.2d 712 (W. Va. 1981) (defendant was required to travel to the forum state because it
indirectly marketed its services by accepting referrals from a forum state facility); Kener-
son v. Stevenson, 604 F.Supp. 792 (D. Maine 1985) (defendant held to be "doing busi-
ness" within the forum state).
73. Gelineau v. New York University Hospital, 375 F. Supp. 661 (D.N.J. 1974).
74. Gelineau, 375 F. Supp. at 667. The Gelineau court acknowledged that the effect
of a defendant's negligence may be felt only in the plaintiff's state. Nevertheless, the
court reasoned that it would be fundamentally unfair to require the defendant to travel to
whatever distant jurisdiction the plaintiff may venture into. Id.
75. 111 111. 2d 69, 488 N.E.2d 1000 (1986).
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port had committed a tortious act within Illinois which gave Illi-
nois courts jurisdiction over him.76 In Highsmith, the father was
awarded custody of his daughter in 1970 after a dissolution pro-
ceeding in California.77 In 1981, the father sent the child to live
with her maternal grandparents in Illinois without seeking a modi-
fication of the dissolution decree.7 8 Subsequently, the child's
mother moved to Illinois and was awarded custody of the child
and child support.7 9 When the father failed to make child support
payments, the mother filed a petition for payment of the money in
the Circuit Court of Henry County, Illinois. 0 The father chal-
lenged the court's jurisdiction over his person.8'
In holding that jurisdiction was proper, the Highsmith court rea-
soned that the father had submitted to the jurisdiction of Illinois
courts by his commission of a tortious act within the state.82 The
court noted that the defendant had an implied duty under the Cali-
fornia judgment to support his child. 83 When the defendant re-
moved the child from the family's home in California and left her
with her grandparents in Illinois, the court reasoned that the de-
fendant had placed in the state an individual who might be totally
unsupported. 4 Accordingly, defendant's subsequent failure to pay
child support was the commission of a tortious act within the
state.85
Highsmith is significant in two respects. First, the decision eluci-
dates the fact that jurisdiction under the tortious-act provision of
the long-arm statute may be premised upon the breach of any duty
imposed by law. 86 In Highsmith, the court relied upon the defend-
ant's implied duty to support his child. This duty arose from the
decree of dissolution that awarded the defendant custody of the
child.8 7 Second, Highsmith lends important clarification to the
scope of the tortious-act provision. In Sawant 8 8 and Yates 89, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the mere breach of a duty to an
76. Id. at 75-76, 488 N.E.2d at 1004.
77. Id. at 70, 488 N.E.2d at 1001.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 71, 488 N.E.2d at 1001.
80. Id. at 71, 488 N.E.2d at 1002.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 74, 488 N.E.2d at 1003.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
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Illinois resident did not constitute the commission of a tort in the
state. In Highsmith, however, the defendant's breach of an implied
duty was sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. These cases may be dis-
tinguished by noting that the defendant in Highsmith sent the child
to Illinois and subjected her to risk by withholding child support.
Thus, in Highsmith, any injury to an Illinois resident was caused
by the defendant's breach of duty.
IV. VENUE
A. Intrastate Forum Non Conveniens
In Meyers v. Bridgeport Machine Division of Textron, Inc. ,9o the
court denied the defendant's motion to transfer a case based on the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. In Meyers, the plaintiff, a resi-
dent of McHenry County, Illinois, was injured in McHenry
County by one of defendant's machines. The plaintiff subsequently
sued the defendant, a Cook County buisness, in a Cook County
Circuit Court. After noting that the facts and witnesses were dis-
tributed evenly among Cook, McHenry, Lake, and Kane Coun-
ties,91 the court held that the plaintiff's choice of a forum was
reasonable.92 Specifically, the court noted that the private interest
of the parties did not favor defendant's request that the case be
litigated in McHenry County. 93 The court concluded that the
Cook County suit permitted reasonable accessibility to witnesses
and sources of proof, and presented no decided obstacles to a fair
trial. Because the defendant did business in Cook County, the fil-
ing of a suit in that county insured that the claim would be tried in
a community with a relationship to the controversy.94
The court's decision in Meyers highlights two areas of signifi-
cance. First, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the
private interest of the parties was subordinate to the public interest
aspect of forum non conveniens. The Meyers court specifically
held that the two interests are of equal value. Second, in applying
90. 113 Ill. 2d 112, 497 N.E.2d 745 (1986).
91. Meyers, 113 I11. 2d 112, 497 N.E.2d at 745 (1986). In Meyers, the plaintiff, a
resident of McHenry County, was injured at his grinding machine job in McHenry
County. He received medical care in McHenry County. The plaintiff's attending sur-
geon maintained an office in Lake County while the defendant's medical expert was from
Kane County. The grinding machine that injured the plaintiff was manufactured in Kane
County, whereas defendant corporation had a registered agent in Cook County, and the
expert engineers resided in Cook County. Id. at 120-21, 497 N.E.2d at 748-49.
92. 113 I11. 2d at 121, 497 N.E.2d at 749.
93. Id. at 121, 497 N.E.2d at 749.
94. Id. at 120-21, 497 N.E.2d at 748.
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the public interest consideration, the court implicitly distinguished
between interstate and intrastate cases. In interstate cases, 9 a
claim by a foreign plaintiff pursuing a claim unrelated to Illinois
may be dismissed unless other justification for suit exists. In intra-
state cases, a court is reluctant to disturb the plaintiff's choice of
forum. Meyers was factually posited in an intrastate context. The
plaintiff resided and was injured in McHenry County. Thus, de-
spite Cook County's tenuous connection to the claim, the court
was reluctant to disturb the plaintiff's choice of forum. 96
B. Interstate Forum Non Conveniens
In Brummett v. Wepfer Marine, Inc.,97 the Illinois Supreme
Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss based on the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens. The plaintiff in Brummett was em-
ployed as a cook on the defendant's ship.98 The plaintiff claimed
she suffered an injury on the vessel while it was docked near
Madison County, Illinois. Relying upon the Jones Act, a federally
created cause of action, the plaintiff filed the complaint in the Cir-
cuit Court of Madison County. 99 The defendant contended that
Madison County was not a convenient forum for litigating the
claim because both the plaintiff and defendant were residents of
Tennessee, the defendant did not conduct business in Illinois, eight
of nine crew members were residents of Tennessee, all records of
the vessel were in Tennessee, and all of plaintiff's treating physi-
cians practiced in Tennessee. °0
The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and held
that, because the tort occurred in the state, Illinois had a signifi-
cant public interest in providing a forum for the injured party."0 '
In reaching its decision, the court drew upon a United States
Supreme Court decision'02 that identified two relevant considera-
tions in deciding an issue of forum non conveniens: the private in-
95. See infra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
96. Meyers, 113 Ill. 2d at 121, 497 N.E.2d at 749. For a criticism of the deference
paid by the majority to plaintiff's choice of forum, see the dissenting opinion of this case
by Judge Ryan. Id. at 123, 497 N.E.2d at 750 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Justice Ryan criti-
cized the plaintiff's alleged abuse of the voluntary dismissal privilege. Id. For further
discussion of the abuse of voluntary dismissal privilege, see infra notes 6-18 and accompa-
nying text.
97. 111 Ill. 2d 495, 490 N.E.2d 694 (1986).
98. Id. at 497, 490 N.E.2d at 696.
99. Id. at 497, 490 N.E.2d at 695.
100. Id. at 498, 490 N.E.2d at 696.
101. Id. at 499-500, 490 N.E.2d at 697.
102. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
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terest of the parties in having a convenient forum in which to
present their evidence,"0 3 and the public interest of the forum state
and other interested states.104 Despite the parties' accessibility to a
Tennessee court, the Brummett court reasoned that Illinois had a
strong public interest in protecting persons and property within the
state from unsafe practices and conditions. 105
Brummett largely may preclude the use of forum non conveniens
as a basis for dismissing claims within which a significant act oc-
curred in Illinois. Though the plaintiff did not rely upon Illinois
substantive law for relief, the Brummett court reasoned that Illi-
nois had an interest in providing the plaintiff a forum to redress the
defendant's locally occurring wrongful conduct. Thus, whether
the issue is one of tort or contract, Brummett supports the conclu-
sion that Illinois has a significant interest in considering the legal-
ity of activity occurring within the state.
The Brummett court noted two instances in which the principle
of forum non conveniens commonly is invoked: when the plaintiff
is a non-resident and the cause of action did not arise in Illinois,"°6
and when the parties would be inconvenienced greatly and sub-
jected to excessive litigation expenses if required to try the case in
Illinois.1 0 7 Additionally, the court in Brummett stated that a trial
court would be justified in dismissing an action based upon the
forum's congested court calendar, only if a foreign forum would
resolve the dispute more expeditiously.10 8
Another significant forum non conveniens case decided by the
Illinois Supreme Court during the Survey period was Kemner v.
Monsanto Co.. 19 In Kemner, the court held that appellate and
supreme court denials of a defendant's petitions for leave to appeal
from an adverse forum non conveniens ruling have no res judicata
effect. 110 Kemner illustrates that relitigation of the forum issue will
not be barred merely by an appellate or supreme court denial of
103. Id. at 509. The factors relevant to the issue of the private interests of the parties
in having a convenient forum are the relative cost of litigation in the forum, the location
and availability of witnesses, and the source of the parties' proof. Id.
104. Id. The matters relevant to the public interest of the forum state include the
desire and duty of a community, through its courts and juries, to pass judgment upon
conduct occurring within its locale; the state's relative interest in applying its laws, both
substantive and conflict of laws, to events that the state has an interest in controlling;
and, the state's interest in affording the plaintiff a forum. Id.
105. Brummett, 111 111. 2d at 499-500, 490 N.E.2d at 697.
106. Id. at 499, 490 N.E.2d at 697.
107. Id. at 502, 490 N.E.2d at 698.
108. Id. at 502-03, 490 N.E.2d at 698.
109. 112 Ill. 2d 223, 492 N.E.2d 1327 (1986).
110. Id. at 240-41, 492 N.E.2d at 1335.
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leave to appeal from an adverse ruling."'I Although it did not affect
the disposition of the case before it, the Kemner court noted the
adoption of new Illinois Supreme Court Rule 187,112 which re-
quires that forum non conveniens motions be filed not later than
ninety days after the last day allowed for the filing of a party's
answer. Rule 187 also requires that hearings on motions of forum
non conveniens be scheduled to allow sufficient time to conduct
discovery on issues of fact. 1 3 Consistent with Kemner, an initial
denial of the motion does not bar the defendant from making a
timely motion to reconsider newly acquired evidence.
V. PLEADINGS AND DISCOVERY
A. Amendment of Pleadings
In Zeh v. Wheeler,"I4 the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the
meaning of the "same transaction or occurrence" requirement and
the relation back rule" 5 in the context of amended pleadings. In
Zeh, the supreme court held that an amendment changing the lo-
cation in a slip-and-fall case does not relate back to the original
complaint. 1 6 The plaintiff, Josephine Zeh, filed a complaint on
February 2, 1981, alleging that she had sustained personal injuries
while descending the stairway of an apartment building. The origi-
nal complaint named John B. Wheeler, John B. Wheeler Com-
pany, and Claud and Agnes Hess as co-defendants. The
defendants operated, managed, and controlled the apartment
building located at 4400 South Wallace in Chicago. Defendant
John B. Wheeler filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging
that he was a trustee under a land trust and held only legal title to
the property. The court granted Wheeler's motion to dismiss and
held that the owners of the property named in the complaint were
Claud and Agnes Hess. The remaining defendants, John B.
Wheeler Company and Claud and Agnes Hess, answered the com-
plaint, admitting ownership of the premises, but generally denying
111. Id.
112. Il. S. Ct. R. 187, 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 1 10A, para. 187 (1985).
113. Id. For an expanded discussion of new Illinois Supreme Court Rule 187, see
infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
114. 111 Ill. 2d 266, 489 N.E.2d 1342 (1986).
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-616(b) (1986). When certain requirements are
met, the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, under the relation back rule, permits an
amended pleading to avoid the impact of the statutes of limitations by relating back to the
date of the filing of the original pleading. Zeh, 111 Ill. 2d at 270, 489 N.E.2d at 1344.
116. Zeh, 111 Ill. 2d at 282, 489 N.E.2d at 1349-50.
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the remaining allegations.' 1 7
On February 1, 1983, an order was entered allowing the plaintiff
to amend her complaint to change the address on the complaint
from 4400 South Wallace to 4400 South Lowe. Oral arguments
revealed that the two addresses were two blocks apart, that John B.
Wheeler managed both properties, and that Claud and Agnes Hess
were the beneficial owners of the property at 4400 South Wallace,
but had no interest in the property at 4400 South Lowe, which was
owned by another man.11
On March 15, 1983, defendants John B. Wheeler Company and
Claud and Agnes Hess moved to dismiss the amended complaint,
arguing that the amended complaint did not relate back to the fil-
ing of the original complaint because the amendment stated a new
and different cause of action which did not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence set forth in the original complaint. On
July 8, 1983, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Claud and Agnes
Hess. On October 25, 1983, the circuit court granted defendants'
motion and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice." 9
The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court and
the Illinois Supreme Court granted plaintiff's petition for leave to
appeal. 120
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the com-
plaint with prejudice.' 2' The court held that the correct location of
a slip-and-fall accident is a material element of the negligence ac-
tion, and changing the location substantially changes the occur-
rence. 22 The court was unpersuaded by plaintiff's argument that
the change of address was merely a redescription of the place
where the incident occurred. 23 Although the court acknowledged
that Illinois courts are liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings
after the applicable statute of limitations has expired, the court
held that the failure to properly plead the location of the injury is
not a technical defect that can be cured after the running of the
117. Id. at 268-69, 489 N.E.2d at 1343.
118. Id. at 269, 489 N.E.2d at 1343.
119. Id. at 270, 489 N.E.2d at 1344.
120. Id. at 268, 489 N.E.2d at 1343.
121. Id. at 283, 489 N.E.2d at 1350.
122. Id. at 276-77, 489 N.E.2d at 1347.
123. Id. But see Harastej v. Reliable Car Rental, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 197 (D.P.R. 1972),
in which an amendment changing "1020 Ashford Ave." to "1010 Ashford Ave." was
permitted because the original complaint also stated that the accident occurred at the
defendant's place of business. Because the defendant owned only one business on Ash-
ford Avenue, the defendant was not prejudiced by the amendment. The facts in the com-
plaint, aside from the erroneous address, identified the correct location. Id. at 200.
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statute of limitations. 124
The court reasoned that the location of the accident was signifi-
cant because it gave the defendants notice of the occurrence which
would serve as the basis of the complaint against the defendant . 25
Although the defendant John B. Wheeler Company managed both
properties, the court noted that nothing in the record showed that
John B. Wheeler Company knew or had any notice that the plain-
tiff's original complaint invoked a claim for an injury arising at the
amended address. 26 Because the facts alleged in the original com-
plaint failed to put all the defendants on notice of the matter cov-
ered by the amendments, the court held that plaintiff's amended
complaint would not be allowed to relate back to the filing of the
original complaint. 27
The court in Zeh considered a problematic issue in the relation
back doctrine. Application of the doctrine is simple when the
amendment merely poses a different form of liability than that al-
leged in the original pleading. Thus, the original pleading provides
the defendant with sufficient cause to investigate the transaction or
occurrence. Literal application of the rule, however, is more troub-
lesome when, as in Zeh, the amendment seeks to correct a mis-
taken date or location. Not infrequently, a pleading mistakenly
identifies the location or time of a critical event. A subsequent
amendment substituting a different location or date may refer to a
completely different transaction or occurrence.
The court in Zeh employed a pragmatic approach to the rule.
Drawing upon decisions interpreting an analogous federal rule, 28
the court held that factors to be considered in determining whether
an amended complaint relates back to the time of filing of the origi-
nal complaint are whether the defendant received adequate notice
of the claim against him and whether the defendant would be
prejudiced unfairly if the amendment is allowed to relate back.'29
The Zeh decision did not address the effect of the defendant's
timely knowledge of facts learned outside the pleadings. The court
noted that there was no contention that the defendant actually
knew of the location relied upon by the plaintiff. The court, how-
ever, stated that it need not decide to what extent such notice may
be considered in determining whether an amendment related back
124. Zeh, 111 III. 2d at 278, 489 N.E.2d at 1347.
125. Id. at 280, 489 N.E.2d at 1349.
126. Id. at 281, 489 N.E.2d at 1349.
127. Id. at 282, 489 N.E.2d at 1349-50.
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
129. Zeh, 1I1 IIll. 2d at 280, 489 N.E.2d at 1348.
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under the provisions of its code.130 In Zeh, the court distinguished
between the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(c). In federal cases, the court noted that Rule
15(c) provided ample support to look beyond the pleadings to de-
termine whether the defendant was aware of the correct transac-
tion or occurrence.
B. Affidavits
In Purtill v. Hess,13 1 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
counteraffidavit in a medical malpractice case was sufficient to
withstand a motion for summary judgment under Supreme Court
Rule 191(b) although it did not demonstrate affirmatively the ex-
pert's competency to testify to the appropriate local standard of
care.132 In Purtill, the dispute concerned whether the defendant
exercised proper care in the examination and diagnosis of the
plaintiff's condition. The defendant moved for summary judg-
ment, filing his own affidavit in support. The affidavit stated that
his conduct conformed to the applicable standard of care exercised
by reasonably well-qualified physicians in his locality. 33 It further
stated that additional diagnostic tests would have been too painful
and unnecessary in the absence of other symptoms. The affidavit
did not explain that a more accurate diagnosis was difficult because
of limited medical resources in the defendant's locality.134
A counter-affidavit provided by plaintiff's expert stated that the
expert was familiar with the nationally observed minimum stan-
dards of acceptable medical care of the plaintiff's condition and
that the defendant had violated the standard in several regards.
The trial court struck the plaintiff's counteraffidavit, concluding
that it did not affirmatively demonstrate the expert's competency
to testify to the appropriate local standard of care. 35 In the ab-
sence of the plaintiff's counter-affidavit, the court granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment and the appellate court
130. Id. at 282, 489 N.E.2d at 1349.
131. 111 Ill. 2d 229, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986).
132. Id. at 251, 489 N.E.2d at 876.
133. Id. at 236-37, 489 N.E.2d at 869-70.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 237-39, 489 N.E.2d at 870. In determining the standard of care for judg-
ing the defendant physician's alleged negligence, Illinois courts have followed the "simi-
lar locality" rule, which requires "a physician to possess and apply that degree of
knowledge, skill, and care which a reasonably well-qualified physician in the same or
similar community would bring to a similar case under similar circumstances." Id. at
242, 489 N.E.2d 872.
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affirmed. 36
The supreme court reversed. In reversing, the Purtill court dis-
tinguished between the sufficiency of an expert's affidavit in a sum-
mary judgment context and the sufficiency of expert testimony at
trial. 137 The court conceded that summary judgment is proper in a
medical malpractice action when the plaintiff fails to demonstrate
an ability to offer competent evidence at trial regarding the applica-
ble standard of care. Nevertheless, the court held that the plain-
tiff's affidavit was sufficient because it questioned whether the
defendant violated a nationally observed minimum standard of
care. ' 38 The court stated that summary judgment might be appro-
priate if further discovery showed that the plaintiff's expert lacked
the competence to testify. The court, however, recognized that a
pretrial motion rarely provides the type of illumination found at
trial. The court opined that the testimony of the plaintiff's expert
and the underlying dispute may be developed fully and accurately
at trial. The Purtill court thus asserted that the trial stage is a
more appropriate time for the court to consider whether the plain-
tiff has carried his burden of proof on the issue of standard of
care. 13
9
Purtill effects a significant change in the substantive law of medi-
cal malpractice and the utilization of motions for summary judg-
ment practice. Prior to Purtill, in cases in which expert testimony
was needed to prove fault, the "similar locality" rule required that
plaintiff's expert have knowledge of the medical practice in defend-
ant's locality or one similar to it. '" When a local expert was un-
available, the plaintiff was required to find an expert familiar with
similar communities, regardless of whether defendant's alleged
malpractice related to the exigencies of practice within his commu-
nity. Purtill addressed this anomaly and tailored the "similar lo-
cality" rule to apply only in those circumstances in which the lack
of support facilities in the community limited the range of available
medical treatment. Thus, if the alleged act of malpractice would
be condemned regardless of the locality, plaintiff's expert could
testify to a national, minimum standard of conduct.'4 '
136. Id. at 233, 489 N.E.2d at 868.
137. Id. at 244, 489 N.E.2d at 873.
138. Id. at 250, 489 N.E.2d at 876.
139. Id. at 244, 489 N.E.2d at 873.
140. Purtill, 111 111. 2d at 246-47, 489 N.E.2d at 874-75.
141. The Purtill court summarized the options as follows:
The physician's professional conduct must be judged in light of the conditions
and facilities with which he must work. If a plaintiff's expert is familiar with
1986]
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 18
Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191, the court in Purtill
emphasized that affidavits in support of summary judgments must
demonstrate that the affiant is competent to testify to the recited
facts. In this regard, the court noted that the content of the affida-
vit must be judged like that of the witness's in court testimony; an
affidavit that fails to establish the witness's foundation to testify
should be stricken. 4 2 Despite this foundational requirement of
competency, an expert most likely will not be required to provide
the factual basis underlying his opinions. 4 3
C. Discovery
1. Protective Orders
In Statland v. Freeland,'44 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
lower court has broad discretion in issuing protective orders. In
Statland, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a pro-
tective order that prevented financial documents obtained in dis-
covery from being used outside of the lawsuit. Prior to the entering
of the protective order, plaintiff had informed the defendants that
he intended to use the documents in an ongoing Internal Revenue
Service investigation. 45 In moving to vacate the protective order,
the plaintiff contended that the trial court failed to abide by Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 201, which specifies when a court will allow a
protective order. 46 The plaintiff further noted that the defendants
the standards of care applicable to conditions and facilities available to the de-
fendant doctor, then he is qualified to testify. If, as in the cases discussed here-
after, there are certain uniform standards that would be applicable to a given
situation regardless of the locality, then the lack of familiarity with the practice
in a particular locality will not disqualify the expert. However, if conditions
and facilities that are available are relevant, then before an expert can express
an opinion as to a physician's conduct, he must be acquainted with accepted
standards of care under similar circumstances.
Id. at 247, 489 N.E.2d at 874-75.
142. Id. at 251, 489 N.E.2d at 876 (citing ILL. S. Cr. R. 191, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, para. 191 (1985)).
143. Wilson v. Clark, 84 111. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836
(1981). In Wilson, the court adopted Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705. Both rules
greatly simplified the presentation of an expert's testimony. As Federal Rule of Evidence
705 indicates, unless directed otherwise by the court, the expert may offer an opinion
without first testifying to the factual basis which supports it. Though good trial strategy
would never dictate offering an unsupported opinion, the rules permit it. Thus, while the
court in Purtill weighed the sufficiency of the expert's affidavit, its unarticulated premise
was that the plaintiff was under no duty to state specifically the facts supporting his
conclusions. See FED. R. EvID. 703, 705.
144. 112 I11. 2d 494, 493 N.E.2d 1075 (1986).
145. Id. at 497, 493 N.E.2d at 1076-77.
146. Id. at 499, 493 N.E.2d at 1077 (citing ILL. S. CT. R. 201, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, para. 201 (1985)).
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were required to allege any facts showing that the entry of a pro-
tective order was necessary, pursuant to Rule 201. '47
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's request, stat-
ing that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(c)(1) does not set forth
specific requirements for protective orders, 4 ' but instead mandates
only information which "justice requires." '49 The court thus held
that a trial court has broad discretion to grant protective orders in
discovery proceedings. 5 ° Because there was no showing of cir-
cumstances that would warrant the supreme court's exercise of su-
pervisory authority, plaintiff's motion to vacate the protective
order was denied.' 5' The supreme court's deference to the protec-
tive order in Statland is consistent with the general philosophy of
permitting a trial court judge to use protective orders to shape and
control discovery.
2. Privileged Matters: Interrogatories
In Richter v. Diamond, 52 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
hospital was not privileged, and instead was required to divulge
information concerning disciplinary actions against a physician on
staff. 153 In Richter, Northwestern Memorial Hospital was found in
civil contempt for its refusal to answer supplemental interrogato-
ries propounded by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in Richter sought to
discern whether the defendant physician's staff privileges were re-
stricted.'54 Northwestern objected to answering the questions, re-
lying on sections 8-2101 and 8-2102 of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure, which protect from disclosure select information con-
cerning internal hospital proceedings.' 55
The court in Richter rejected Northwestern's argument and held
that the information requested by the supplemental interrogatories
was outside the scope of sections 8-2101 and 82102 and therefore
was not privileged.' 56 The court reasoned that the statutory privi-
lege protected only the hospital's peer-review process, 157 a protec-
tion necessary to ensure the effectiveness of professional self-
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 499, 493 N.E.2d at 1078.
151. Id.
152. 108 Ill. 2d 265, 483 N.E.2d 1256 (1985).
153. Id. at 270, 483 N.E.2d at 1258.
154. Id. at 268, 483 N.E.2d at 1257.
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2101 to -2102 (1985).
156. Richter, 108 Il1. 2d at 270, 483 N.E.2d at 1258.
157. Id. at 269, 483 N.E.2d at 1258.
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evaluation by members of the medical profession. The Richter
court held, however, that the privilege did not extend to restric-
tions imposed by the hospital as a result of the peer-review
process. 158
The Richter decision reflects an insightful view of the peer-re-
view privilege. The desired goal in the peer-review process is to
encourage medical facilities to root out incompetent staff members.
The existing privilege adequately promotes this goal by protecting
the secrecy of the peer-review process while allowing publicity of
the results of the review.
VI. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
In Buzz Barton & Associates v. Giannone,159 the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of section 11-110 of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure.1" Section 11-110 provides that a party
wrongfully granted a preliminary injunction is liable for damages
resulting from the injunction. In Buzz Barton, the plaintiff sought
to have section 1 1-1 10 declared unconstitutional on equal protec-
tion and due process grounds and because it denied the plaintiff
free access to the courts.1 6 ' The plaintiff raised two principal con-
tentions. First, the plaintiff asserted that it was treated differ-
ently 162 than other parties seeking relief through the courts because
others were not required to pay damages if the relief they were
granted initially was later dissolved. 163 Secondly, the plaintiff ar-
gued that liability for damages caused by a preliminary injunction
constituted an unreasonable restraint upon its right to seek judicial
redress.164
The supreme court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, reasoning
that preliminary injunctions are distinguishable from other types of
litigation because a party seeking a preliminary injunction is not
158. Id.
159. 108 111. 2d 373, 483 N.E.2d 1271 (1985).
160. Id. at 388, 483 N.E.2d at 1278.
161. Id. at 381, 483 N.E.2d at 1275.
162. Id. The dissimilar treatment between a party who seeks a preliminary injunc-
tion that is later dissolved and a party granted other relief that is later dissolved stems
from the fact that instead of merely restoring any benefit received from the erroneous
judgment or decree, the party who is wrongfully issued a preliminary injunction is liable
for all damages caused by the wrongful issuance. Id.
163. Id. In Buzz Barton, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of the
plaintiff to enforce a restrictive covenant contained in an employment contract. When the
appellate court reversed the order granting the preliminary injuction, the defendants filed
a motion for assessment of damages under section 11-110 of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch 110, para. 11-110 (1985)).
164. Buzz Barton, 108 I11. 2d at 383, 483 N.E.2d at 1276.
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required to present evidence which would entitle him to relief on
the merits.' 65 The court noted that when a preliminary injunction
is granted, a party is allowed to interfere in the activities of another
party on the mere showing that the plaintiff is likely to prevail on
the merits. The Buzz Barton court stated that this extraordinary
characteristic of a preliminary injunction justified holding the mov-
ing party liable for all damages upon a subsequent finding that the
issuance of the injunction was wrongful.' 66
Section 11-110 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure applies
only to the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a prelimi-
nary injunction. 167 Thus, Buzz Barton illustrates that no liability
exists under the section for a wrongfully issued permanent injunc-
tion. Indeed, the court noted that parties and courts move fre-
quently from consideration of preliminary relief to consideration of
permanent injunction.1 6  Nevertheless, a party may be forced to
seek preliminary injunctive relief, and thereby incur the risk of lia-
bility as established in Buzz Barton, if a congested trial calendar
delays the jury trial for several years.
VII. INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
In Feen v. Ray, 169 the Illinois Supreme Court dismissed a tax-
payer's derivative suit on behalf of a school district when the
school district was an indispensable party and the plaintiff volun-
tarily had allowed the district to be dismissed from the lititgation.
In Feen, the plaintiff initiated the suit as a taxpayer in the school
district. 1' ° The original defendants in the litigation included Fred
Ray, Zion State Bank & Trust Company, School District No. 126,
and the Lake County regional superintendent of schools. 171 The
plaintiff alleged that Fred Ray had invested most of the school dis-
trict's funds in accounts bearing little or no interest in Zion State
Bank. Ray was an officer and stockholder of Zion State Bank at
165. Id. at 382, 483 N.E.2d at 1275.
166. Id. at 384, 483 N.E.2d at 1276.
167. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 11-110 (1985). In a related provision, section 11-
103 provides that the court, in its discretion, may require a party seeking a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction to post a bond sufficient to cover the costs and
damages that might be incurred by the opponent should the relief be wrongly issued. Id.
at para. 11-103.
168. See, e.g., Power Electric v. Maywood-Proviso State Bank, 60 Ill. App. 3d 685,
377 N.E.2d 142 (1st Dist. 1978).
169. 109 Ill. 2d 339, 487 N.E.2d 619 (1985).
170. Id. at 342, 487 N.E.2d at 619.
171. Id. at 343, 487 N.E.2d at 620.
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the time. 72 The plaintiff taxpayer sought to recover the lost inter-
est. 173 The plaintiff stipulated to an order dismissing School Dis-
trict No. 126 from the lawsuit, with prejudice to future action. 7 4
The remaining defendants then filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
that the School District was an indispensable party, the absence of
which rendered plaintiff's complaint defective. 75  The supreme
court agreed and granted defendants' motion to dismiss. 6
In holding that the school district was an indispensable party,
the Feen court noted that the interests of the school district were
not affected merely by the litigation, but instead provided the en-
tire basis for the lawsuit. 77 The plaintiff did not claim injury to
himself; he sought recovery solely on behalf of the school dis-
trict.17  Moreover, absent the district, no party before the court
could be awarded relief if the plaintiff prevailed on the merits. 179
The court further observed that the school district did not lose its
status as a necessary party merely because the district sought its
own dismissal from the plaintiff's action. 80
VIII. APPEALS
A. Supreme Court Authority To Review
In Wimmer v. Koenigseder,'8 ' the Illinois Supreme Court held
that an issue may be considered on appeal although not raised at
trial when the record contains all the factual materials necessary to
decide the issue. 18 2 In Wimmer, pursuant to section 2-301, the de-
fendants filed special appearances contesting the court's exercise of
in personam jurisdiction. Consistent with procedures controlling a
special appearance, the defendants limited their argument to the
jurisdictional issue and never objected that the complaint failed to
state a legally sufficient cause of action.8 3 The appellate court held
that the defendants were subject to jurisdiction under two provi-
sions of the long-arm statute: 184 first, defendants transacted busi-
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 344, 487 N.E.2d at 620.
176. Id. at 349, 487 N.E.2d at 623.
177. Id. at 344, 487 N.E.2d at 621.
178. Id. at 344-45, 487 N.E.2d at 621.
179. Id. at 347, 487 N.E.2d at 621.
180. Id. at 345-46, 487 N.E.2d at 622.
181. 108 Ill. 2d 435, 484 N.E.2d 1088 (1985).
182. Id. at 439, 484 N.E.2d at 1090.
183. Id.
184. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-209(a)(1), (2) (1985)).
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ness within the state; and second, they committed a tortious act
within the state. The supreme court elected not to decide the juris-
dictional issue and instead considered the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. The court reasoned that judicial resources were wasted
by continued rulings on the jurisdictional issue when it was clear
from the record that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action. 185
The decision in Wimmer may provide an impetus for changing
the procedures used to challenge in personam jurisdiction. Cur-
rently, a defendant who files a special appearance must limit his
objection to the issue of jurisdiction. 8 6 Objections not related to
jurisdiction constitute a general appearance and waive any defect
of in personam jurisdiction. 187  Wimmer illustrates the wasteful
character of this method. By ignoring jurisdiction and determining
the sufficiency of the complaint, the court in Wimmer chose an
economical approach, though one specifically prohibited for de-
fendants challenging jurisdiction. Although several grounds may
support the dismissal of an action, Illinois' special appearance rule
precludes the defendant from raising any of them until resolution
of the jurisdictional issue. The decision in Wimmer highlights the
value of abandoning the present rule in favor of a procedure that
permits all objections to be raised initially. 1 8
Another recent decision of the Illinois Supreme Court concerns
the flexibility of the supreme court in exercising its rulemaking au-
thority over the appellate process. In Johnson v. Colley, I 9 the Illi-
nois Supreme Court granted a motion for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration after the denial of a leave to appeal. 90 The plain-
tiff in Johnson argued that the denial of the petition for leave to
appeal was a final order and that the rules of the court made no
provision for a motion for reconsideration. 191 The court allowed
the motion for reconsideration to be filed in accordance with Illi-
nois Supreme Court Rule 361,192 although the Rule made no provi-
sion for the filing of a motion for reconsideration after the denial of
a petition for leave to appeal. The Johnson court reasoned that it
185. Wimmer, 108 Ill. 2d at 439, 484 N.E.2d at 1090.
186. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 para. 2-301(a) (1985).
187. Id.
188. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b). In Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979), the Court forestalled a decision on a difficult issue of jurisdiction by dismissal
of the action on the basis of improper venue.
189. 111 Ill. 2d 468, 490 N.E.2d 685, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 113 (1986).
190. Id. at 472-73, 490 N.E.2d at 686-87.
191. Id. at 472, 490 N.E.2d at 686.
192. ILL. S. CT. R. 361, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 361 (1985).
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was vested with rulemaking authority sufficiently comprehensive to
regulate all aspects of the appellate process,193 including pending
appeals.'"
B. New Trial
In Marotta v. General Motors Corp.,' 9 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that an entry of a judgment on the verdict is not a
prerequisite, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306, for allowing a
petition for leave to appeal from an order granting a new trial.1 96
In Marotta, the jury returned verdicts on which the circuit court
refused to enter judgment, stating the verdicts were inconsistent
and incongruous. 97 The circuit court then granted motions for a
new trial. The court found the jury verdicts confusing and defense
counsel's closing argument prejudicial. 98  Pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 306(a)(1)(i), which provided for appeal in the instance
of a new trial, the defendant, General Motors, sought leave to ap-
peal the new trial order to the appellate court. The appeal was
denied. 99 The supreme court, however, allowed General Motors'
petition for leave to appeal.2°
Before the supreme court ruled on the propriety of the new trial
order,20 ' the court addressed plaintiff's contention that the circuit
court had entered no appealable order.20 2 The plaintiff contended
that, because no judgment was entered on the allegedly inconsis-
tent verdicts, the effect of the order was to declare a mistrial - an
order not appealable under Rule 306.203 The Marotta court rejected
the notion that there was a distinction between a new trial granted
after a mistrial and one occurring after entry of judgment. 214 The
court held that Rule 306 did not require an entry of judgment on
193. 111 Ill. 2d at 472, 490 N.E.2d at 686.
194. Id. Plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari was premised on the argument
that, based on the existing rules, he gained a protected property interest in his judgment
when the Illinois Supreme Court initially denied defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
He argued that the Illinois Supreme Court's reversal constituted a deprivation of his
property interest without due process of law. Id.
195. 108 Ill. 2d 168, 483 N.E.2d 503 (1985).
196. Id. at 175, 483 N.E.2d at 505-06 (citing ILL. S. CT. R. 306, ILL. REV. STAT. Ch.
1 A, para. 306 (1985)).
197. Id. at 172, 483 N.E.2d at 504.
198. Id. at 174-75, 483 N.E.2d at 505.
199, Id. at 172, 483 N.E.2d at 504.
200. Id.
201. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
202. Marotta, 108 Ill. 2d at 175, 483 N.E.2d at 505.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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the verdict as a prerequisite to a petition for leave to appeal from
an order granting a motion for a new trial.2 °5
The Marotta court, however, further noted that the trial court
erred in not promptly entering judgment upon return of the ver-
dict. 20 6 Section 2-1202(b) requires that the trial court promptly
enter judgment unless the verdict fails to express clearly the jury's
intent. 20 7 The court emphasized that compliance with the rule was
essential to providing a uniform system of time limits within which
post-trial motions must be filed.20 s
On the merits of the appeal, the court held that the trial court
had abused its discretion in granting a new trial.20 9 In reaching its
decision, the following conduct in defendant's closing argument
was discounted as harmless error: the defendant's violation of the
terms of an in limine order which barred reference to a loan agree-
ment made between the plaintiff and a co-defendant; and the de-
fendant's reading and overhead display of plaintiff's deposition and
earlier trial testimony, neither of which had been admitted into evi-
dence during the trial.210 The court reasoned that the errors were
not likely to affect the jury's deliberations 2 because disclosure of
plaintiff's prior testimony was not sufficiently prejudicial to grant a
new trial; and further, defendant's statement made in violation of
the court's order likely was misunderstood by the jury.21 2 With
respect to the latter proposition, the court held that plaintiff's un-
timely objection to defendant's argument rendered the error pre-
sumptively harmless. After noting that the plaintiff waited to
object until the defendant concluded its argument, the court noted
that the expected procedure to preserve an issue for review requires
that a party object contemporaneously to an erroneous argument
and then request remedial relief such as an instruction to disregard
the comment or a mistrial.213
Marotta undercuts the authority of the trial courts. A trial
205. Id. at 175, 483 N.E.2d at 505-06.
206. Id. at 176, 483 N.E.2d at 506.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 180, 483 N.E.2d at 508.
210. Id. at 179-80, 483 N.E.2d at 507-08.
211. Id. at 180, 483 N.E.2d at 508.
212. 108 Ill. 2d at 175, 483 N.E.2d at 505. After arguing that the co-defendant's case
supported plaintiff's theory of liability against General Motors, defendant told the jury:
... you'll be given an instruction that you can consider circumstantial evidence,
and I think that situation just two and two adds up to the only word I have is a
four letter word, but it's D-E-A-L [sic].
Id.
213. Id. at 179, 483 N.E.2d at 507.
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court's overzealous granting of a new trial might infringe upon the
jury's role as trier of fact.214 That encroachment is most probable
when the court decides that a new trial is needed because the ver-
dict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. No such concern
arises when a new trial is granted because of trial error. In the
latter instance, the trial judge concludes that the verdict was
reached improperly. Generally, given a judge's first-hand assess-
ment of a case, wide latitude is given to his decision to grant a new
trial based upon error. 215 The Marotta decision evinces little defer-
ence, if any, to the trial judge's authority and ability to assess the
consequences of defendant's erroneous comments. Secondly, and
perhaps most importantly, the court's decision undermines the
trial court's authority to make and enforce in limine orders.
Though the trial court's order may have been erroneous, 2 6 defend-
ant's closing argument communicated to the jury a fact that the
trial judge previously had found inadmissible. Thus, the Marotta
court contravened the trial judge's assessment of the error's harm-
ful effect.
Another Survey period case examining whether an order was fi-
nal and appealable was In re Marriage of Canon.2"7 In Canon, the
supreme court held that the new inclusion of a review provision in
a marriage dissolution order does not bar the appealability of the
order.218 In Canon, the circuit court entered an order dissolving
the marriage of the parties. This order included property division
and maintenance provisions.21 9 The maintenance provision specifi-
cally stated that the maintenance award was reviewable by the cir-
cuit court within two years.220 When both parties attempted to
appeal the order, the appellate court held that the order was not
final and appealable because the circuit court retained jurisdiction
to review the order within two years.22'
In making its decision, the supreme court distinguished its ear-
214. See generally Johnston, Jury Subornation Through Judicial Control, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 24 (1980).
215. Id.
216. Marotta, 108 Ill. 2d at 178, 483 N.E.2d at 507. The supreme court held that
evidence of a loan-agreement between plaintiff and a co-defendant is relevant in order to
discern the credibility of witnesses who may benefit by the agreement. The Marotta court
opined that there was no offer of proof that any witnesses knew of, or would benefit from,
the agreement. Id.
217. 112 Ill. 2d 552, 494 N.E.2d 490 (1986).
218. Id. at 556, 494 N.E.2d at 492.
219. Id. at 553, 494 N.E.2d at 491.
220. Id. at 553-54, 494 N.E.2d at 491.
221. Id. at 554, 494 N.E.2d at 491.
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lier decision in In Re Marriage of Leopando.2 2 In Leopando, the
circuit court entered a permanent custody order concerning the
parties' minor child, but reserved for future consideration the is-
sues of maintenance, property division, and attorney fees. The Leo-
pando court held that issues in a petition for dissolution, including
custody, property disposition and support, are not separate, unre-
lated claims, but instead are separate issues relating to the same
claim. Until all of the ancillary issues are resolved, the court held
that a petition for dissolution was not adjudicated fully. Accord-
ingly, the Leopando court concluded that the custody order was
not final and appealable because all of the matters that were ancil-
lary to the dissolution had not yet been resolved.223
In reversing the appellate court decision in Canon, the Illinois
Supreme Court distinguished its facts from Leopando and held that
the inclusion in a dissolution order of a provision for review does
not render the order unappealable. 224 The Canon court held that
Leopando was distinguishable because the circuit court in Leo-
pando had made a decision as to each of the ancillary issues regard-
ing property division, attorney fees, and maintenance.225
The most significant aspect of Canon is the distinction the Illi-
nois Supreme Court made from its opinion in Leopando. Leopando,
in an effort to avoid the piecemeal review of ongoing litigation,
strongly implied that all issues involved in the dissolution action
should be decided before appeal. The Canon decision, on the other
hand, suggests a more pragmatic determination of whether the
trial court's order is final and appealable. The Canon decision,
however, fails to address the appealability of a final order that de-
cides only one of the parties' property and financial issues. When
the record is suitably developed, it is common for courts to decide
one issue but await a further development of the facts to decide the
remaining ancillary issues. In this instance, the decision in Leo-
pando still may deny an immediate appeal of the decision.
C. Untimely Appeals
In Lombard v. Elmore,226 the mistaken interpretation of the trial
court's post-judgment order led to plaintiffs' untimely filing of a
notice of appeal. On December 14, 1982, the trial court in Loin-
222. Leopando, 96 Il1. 2d 114, 449 N.E.2d 137 (1983).
223. 112 Il1. 2d at 555, 494 N.E.2d at 492.
224. Id. at 555-56, 494 N.E.2d at 492.
225. Id.
226. 112 Ill. 2d 467, 493 N.E.2d 1063 (1986).
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bard entered judgment in favor of defendant's counterclaim.227
The judgment specifically provided that it was final and appealable,
consistent with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a).228 On the
same day, in response to defendant's motion to amend his counter-
claim to conform to the proof, the trial court entered an order stay-
ing all matters until further order of the court, establishing a
briefing schedule, and setting a hearing date on January 20, 1983 to
address defendant's motions.229 The hearing date exceeded plain-
tiffs' thirty day period in which to appeal the December 14, 1982
judgment. On January 20, 1983, the trial court dismissed the de-
fendant's motions. 230 On February 17, 1983, plaintiffs filed a post-
trial motion attacking the judgment entered against them.23' After
extended hearings, the court denied plaintiffs' motion and plaintiff
filed a notice of appeal within thirty days of the denial.232 In sup-
port of their appeal, plaintiffs asserted that the December 14, 1982
order staying all proceedings was, in effect, an extension of time for
leave to file a post-trial motion.2 33 Accordingly, plaintiffs con-
tended, the post-trial motion and notice of appeal were filed in a
timely manner.234
The appellate court rejected plaintiffs' argument.235 The court
held that the stay order applied only to defendant's post-trial mo-
tions. The reviewing court reasoned that the trial court could not
enter an appealable judgment and simultaneously stay all proceed-
ings.2 3 ' The supreme court, without discussing plaintiffs' argu-
ment, affirmed the appellate court's dismissal of plaintiffs' appeal.
Lombard underscores the importance of accurately ascertaining
the terms of post-trial orders. The order in Lombard was ambigu-
ous and conceivably interpreted as extending the time for plaintiffs'
appeal. The stay was prompted by defendant's motion to amend
the complaint that was the basis of the challenged judgment.
Thus, plaintiffs might well believe that appealability was forestalled
until the terms of the complaint were final. Indeed, the trial court,
when pressed by defendant to dismiss plaintiffs' post-trial motion
227. Id. at 471, 493 N.E.2d at 1064.
228. Id. at 471, 493 N.E.2d at 1065.
229. Lombard v. Elmore, 134 I1. App. 3d 898, 908, 480 N.E.2d 1329, 1336 (1985),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 112 Ill. 2d 467, 493 N.E.2d 1063 (1986).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 908, 480 N.E.2d at 1336-37.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 909, 480 N.E.2d at 1334.
236. Id.
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as untimely, interpreted the stay order in the same manner as did
plaintiffs and considered the motion timely though it was filed on
February 17, 1983.237
Another case decided during the Survey period concerning the
filing of a notice of appeal was Ferguson v. Riverside Medical
Center.23 s In Ferguson, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
judgment cannot be attacked by motion or appealed during the
time period between the announcement of the judgment and the
entry of the formal order.239 In Ferguson, the plaintiff sued defend-
ants Riverside Medical Center and doctors Parkhurst, Ehrlich, and
Sutton.2 ° A motion to dismiss with prejudice was granted to de-
fendant Parkhurst on February 3, 1983.241 The motion required
the attorney for defendant Parkhurst to prepare a formal order.242
The formal order granting defendant Parkhurst's motion to dis-
miss the complaint with prejudice was filed on March 29, 1983.243
No finding regarding appealability was made under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 304(a). 2" The plaintiff, Ferguson, filed a no-
tice of appeal on February 17, 1983,245 between the time the memo-
randum opinion was issued and the filing of the formal order. The
court ruled that Ferguson's attempt to appeal the order in favor of
Parkhurst was premature.246 The Ferguson court reasoned that,
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 272,247 when a judge requires
the submission of a written judgment to be signed by him, the judg-
ment becomes final when filed.248 If no such written order is re-
quired, the judgment is final when recorded. 249 The court held
that, a judgment cannot be attacked by motion, appealed from, or
237. Id.
238. 111 I1. 2d 436, 490 N.E.2d 1252 (1986).
239. Id. at 441, 490 N.E.2d at 1254.
240. Id. The only action considered in this discussion is the claim against defendant
Parkhurst.
241. Id. at 439, 490 N.E.2d at 1253.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. (citing ILL. S. CT. R. 304(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 l0A, para. 304(a)
(1985)).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 440-41, 490 N.E.2d at 1254.
247. ILL. S. CT. R. 272, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I l1A, para. 272 (1985).
248. Ferguson, I 11 Ill. 2d at 441, 490 N.E.2d at 1254.
249. Id. at 440, 490 N.E.2d at 1253. The Ferguson court held that plaintiff had filed a
timely appeal on May 4, 1983, of an order granting defendant Ehrlich's motion to dis-
miss. The ruling was docketed on April 12, 1983, and the docket entry did not indicate
that a formal order was to follow, though one was filed on April 22, 1983. This order
contained a finding under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a), making the judgment ap-
pealable. Id.
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enforced during the time between the announcement of judgment
and the entry of the formal order.250 Therefore, because the plain-
tiff appealed after the entry of the memorandum opinion, but
before the entry of the formal order, her notice of appeal was pre-
mature and could not confer jurisdiction on the appellate court.25'
Finally, the court noted that the formal order granting Parkhurst's
motion would not have been appealable even if timely filed. Be-
cause the order disposed of fewer than all parties, no appeal would
be allowed until the trial judge certified that there was no just rea-
son to delay the appeal as required under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 304(a).252
IX. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STATUTORY LAW
2 5 3
A. New Or Modified Illinois Supreme Court Rules
1. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 187: Forum Non Conveniens 25 4
New Illinois Supreme Court Rule 187255 became effective Au-
250. Id. at 441, 490 N.E.2d at 1254.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 441-42, 490 N.E.2d at 1254. The court also noted that the timely appeal
of the order granting co-defendant Ehrlich's dismissal motion did not operate as an ap-
peal of the earlier ruling on defendant Parkhurst's motion. Id.
253. See Wright, Trial Briefs, 31 I.S.B.A. NEWSLETTER 10 (1986).
254, See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
255. ILL. S. CT. R. 187, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1OA, para. 187 (1986). Rule 187
reproduced in full, states as follows:
(a) Time for Filing. A motion to dismiss or transfer the action under the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens must be filed by a party not later than 90 days
after the last day allowed for the filing of that party's answer.
(b) Proceedings on Motions. Hearings on motions to dismiss or transfer the
action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens shall be scheduled so as to
allow the parties sufficient time to conduct discovery on issues of fact raised by
such motions. Such motions may be supported and opposed by affidavits, any
competent evidence adduced by the parties shall also be considered. The deter-
mination of any issue of fact in connection with such a motion does not consider
a determination of the merits of the case or any aspect thereof.
(c) Proceedings Under Granting of Motions.
(1) Intrastate transfer of action. The clerk from which a transfer is granted to
another circuit court in this State on the ground of forum non conveniens
shall immediately certify and transmit to the clerk of the court to which the
transfer is ordered the originals of all papers filed in the case together with
copies of all orders entered therein. In the event of a severance, certified
copies of papers filed and orders entered shall be transmitted. The clerk of
the court to which the transfer is ordered shall file the papers and transcript
transmitted to him or her and docket the case, and the action shall proceed
and be determined as if it had originated in that court. The costs attending a
transfer shall be taxed by the clerk of the court from which the transfer is
granted, and, together with the filing fee in the transferee court, shall be paid
by the party or parties who applied for the transfer.
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gust 1, 1986. The Rule concerns the procedural aspects of filing a
motion to dismiss or transfering a case under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. The Rule addresses both interstate and intrastate
motions, and requires a defendant, or other moving party, to file
his motion within ninety days after the last day for filing his an-
swer. 256 Under the provisions of Rule 187(a), a later joined defend-
ant is not foreclosed from filing a forum non conveniens motion by
another defendant's failure to do so in a timely manner.257
Under Rule 187(b), hearings on the motions must be scheduled
to allow the parties to conduct discovery on issues of fact raised by
the motion.25 The Rule provides that the motions may be sup-
ported or opposed by affidavit, and the court should consider any
competent evidence in ruling on the motion. 259 Any factual deter-
minations made by the court do not constitute a determination of
any aspect of the case.2"
2. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 19: Notice of
Claims of Unconstitutionality
New Illinois Supreme Court Rule 19261 became effective on Au-
(2)Dismissal of action. Dismissal of an action under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens shall be upon the following conditions:
(i) if the plaintiff elects to file the action in another forum within six
months of the dismissal order, the defendant shall accept the service of
process from that court; and
(ii) if the statute of limitations has run in the other forum, the defendant
shall waive that defense.
If the defendant refuses to abide by these conditions, the cause shall be rein-
stated for further proceedings in the court in which the dismissal was granted.
If the court in the other forum refuses to accept jurisdiction, the plaintiff may,
within 30 days of the final order refusing jurisdiction, reinstate the action in the
court in which the dismissal was granted. The costs attending a dismissal may
be awarded in the discretion of the court.
Id.
256. Id. at para. 187(a).
257. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 187, committee comments (Supp. 1986).
258. ILL. S. CT. R. 187(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 187(b) (Supp. 1986).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. ILL. S. CT. R. 19, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 OA, para. 19 (Supp. 1986). Rule 19
reproduced in full states as follows:
(a) Notice Required. In any cause or proceeding in which the constitutionality
of a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation affecting the public interest
is raised, and to which action or proceeding the State or the political subdivi-
sion, agency, or officer affected is not already a party, the litigant raising the
constitutional issue shall serve an appropriate notice thereof on the Attorney
General, State's Attorney, municipal counsel or agency attorney, as the case
may be.
(b) Contents and Time for Filing Notice. The notice shall identify the particu-
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gust 1, 1986. Rule 19 requires that parties challenging the consti-
tutionality of a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation
affecting the public interest notify the government when the gov-
ernmental2 62 entity that is the subject of the challenged law is not
already a party.2 63 Notice must be given with the first pleading
which raises a constitutional question. The notice must identify the
particular law being challenged and give a brief description of the
nature of the challenge.26  The purpose of the notice requirements
is to give the government an opportunity, rather than an obliga-
tion, to intervene in cases to defend the validity of its law.265
3. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216: Admissions of Fact or
Genuineness of Documents
Effective August 1, 1985, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216266
was amended. Amended Rule 216 provides that an admission by a
party will be considered an admission for the purpose of a pending
lawsuit and any refiling of a pending lawsuit within one year under
section 13-217 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.267 The ad-
mission, however, cannot be used against the party for any other
purpose in any other proceeding.268
4. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 204: Compelling
Appearance of Deponent
Effective August 1, 1985, a new amendment to subsection (c) of
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 204269 requires that the discovery dep-
lar statute, ordinance or regulation, and shall briefly describe the nature of the
constitutional challenge. The notice shall be served at the time of suit, answer
or counterclaim, if constitutionality is raised at that level, or promptly after the
constitutional question arises as a result of a circuit or reviewing court ruling or
judgment.
(c) Purpose of Notice. The purpose of such notice shall be to afford the State,
political subdivision, agency or officer, as the case may be, the opportunity, but
not the obligation, to intervene in the cause or proceeding for the purpose of
defending the constitutionality of the law or regulation challenged. The election
to intervene shall be subject to applicable provisions of law governing interven-
tion or impeding of interested parties.
Id.
262. Id. Governmental entity is defined to include state, political subdivision, gov-
ernment agency, or government office. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. ILL. S. CT. R. 216, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 216 (1985).
267. Id. at para. 216(e).
268. Id.
269. ILL. S. CT. R. 204(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 204(c) (1985).
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osition of a doctor be taken only with his consent or pursuant to a
subpoena issued upon court order. This new amendment applies
only to physicians and surgeons being deposed in their professional
capacity.27
5. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 222: Limited and Simplified
Discovery in Certain Cases
New Illinois Supreme Court Rule 222271 became effective on Au-
gust 1, 1985. The Rule applies to all civil actions based in tort or
contract not in excess of $15,000. It does not apply to actions seek-
ing punitive damages or equitable relief.272 The Rule provides for
automatic disclosure by requiring the plaintiff to file a "disclosure
statement" with the complaint. 273 The disclosure statement must
set forth information including the identity of witnesses, the loca-
tion of documents, the description of damages, and the identity of
any insurance carriers. 274 Discovery is limited to twenty interroga-
tories and three discovery depositions. No evidence depositions
are allowed unless all the parties agree or the court orders upon a
showing of good cause.275
B. Modified Illinois Code of Civil Procedure Sections
1. Section 2-1005: Summary Judgment
Effective September 15, 1985, subsection (d) was added to sec-
tion 2-1005276 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. This subsec-
tion provides a major innovation in summary procedures by
empowering a court to make a summary determination of major
issues raised by an action even when those major issues do not de-
270. Id.
271. ILL. S. CT. R. 222, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 222 (1986).
272. Id. at para. 222(a).
273. Id. at para. 222(b).
274. Id.
275. Id. at para. 222(c).
276. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1005(d) (1985). Subsection (d) reads as
follows:
If the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to one
or more of the major issues in the case, but that substantial controversy exists
with respect to other major issues, or if a party moves for summary determina-
tion of one or more, but less than all, of the major issues in the case, and the
court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to that issue or those
issues, the court shall thereupon draw an order specifying the major issue or
issues that appear without substantial controversy, and directing such further
proceedings upon the remaining undetermined issues as are just. Upon the trial
of the case, the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall
be conducted accordingly.
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termine the whole case. Under new subsection (d), piecemeal de-
termination of a case is allowed by summary procedures. Thus, a
party is allowed to move for summary determination of one or
more major issues of the case, but is not required to move for sum-
mary determination of all of the issues in the case.277
2. Section 2-1302: Notice of Entry of Default Order or
Dismissal for Want of Prosecution
Effective January 1, 1986, section 2-1302278 of the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure was amended in two significant ways. First, sub-
section (a) of section 2-1302 was amended to require an attorney
for the party moving for an order of default to give notice of the
default order.279 Prior to the amendment, notice had to be given
by the clerk of the court. Failure by the attorney to give notice
does not impair the validity of the order of default. Also, subsec-
tion (d) of section 2-1302 was amended to provide that no notice of
a dismissal for want of prosecution is necessary, when the plaintiff
has been notified in advance that the court is considering the entry
of such an order. Notice, however, may still be required by local
rule. 280
3. Section 11-102: Preliminary Injunctions
Effective January 1, 1986, section 1 1-102281 of the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure was amended. The preliminary injunction stat-
ute now states that no preliminary injunction shall be issued with-
out notice to the other party. Prior to the amendment, if a party
could demonstrate that imminent and irreparable injury would oc-
cur before notice could be served, the preliminary injunction could
be entered without notice to the opponent. The amendment elimi-
nates this exception.28 2
Practitioners should note that section 11-101 of the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure,28 3 concerning temporary restraining orders, has
not been amended. A temporary restraining order still may be en-
tered without notice to the opposing party. Nevertheless, a tempo-
rary restraining order is only valid for ten days unless renewed by
277. Id.
278. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-1302 (1985).
279. Id. at para. 2-1302(a).
280. Id. at para. 2-1302(d).
281. Id. at para. 11-102.
282. Id.
283. Id. at para. 11-101.
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the court.2 84
4. Section 2-209.1: Actions by and Against
Voluntary Associations
Effective November 26, 1985, section 2-209.1 of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure 285 was amended to provide that a volun-
tary unincorporated association, including a labor union, may sue
and be sued in its own name. It is unclear under the statute
whether a member can claim a right to be notified of the pending
lawsuit and whether the member can challenge enforcement of a
judgment by claiming no notice was provided.
5. Section 2-613: Separate Counts and Defenses
Effective September 20, 1985, section 2-613 of the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure286 was amended to reflect the addition of com-
parative negligence to the list of defenses which must be pled af-
firmatively. The amended section requires an affirmative pleading
that the negligence of a complaining party contributed in whole or
in part to the injury which is the subject of the complaint. 8 7
6. Section 2-1109: Itemized Verdicts
Section 2-1109288 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure requires
that a jury hearing a personal injury case render itemized verdicts.
Effective August 15, 1985, the section was amended to require
greater itemization in medical malpractice cases. Under the new
law, the verdict must be separated into economic and noneconomic
loss. The economic loss portion must then be separated into three
categories: the amount awarded as compensation for reasonable
expenses incurred or future expenses for medical, surgical, x-ray,
dental, drugs, therapy and other health or rehabilitation services;
the amount awarded as compensation for lost wages or lost earning
capacity; and, the amount awarded for all other economic losses.289
The verdict also must be separated into amounts awarded before
the verdict was entered and amounts awarded for future losses.29 °
284. Id.
285. Id. at para. 2-209.1.
286. Id. at para. 2-613.
287. Id. at para. 2-613(d).
288. Id. at para. 2-1109.
289. Id.
290. Id.
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X. CONCLUSION
The judicial decisions and changes in the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure discussed in this article represent the major develop-
ments in Illinois procedural law since July 1985. The most signifi-
cant judicial decisions concerned statutes of limitations and repose,
jurisdiction, venue, pleadings and discovery, and appeals. The leg-
islative changes to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure were signifi-
cant in the areas of summary judgment proceedings, forum non
conveniens, and itemized verdicts.
